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North Carolina Baptist Hospitals, Inc. v. Harris:
North Carolina Adopts a Gender-Neutral Approach
to the Doctrine of Necessaries
In a medical emergency, the last thing on anyoile's mind is who will pay the
bill. Although it is standard practice for a hospital to request information about
insurance prior to admission, there is no guarantee that the information pro-
vided is correct or that the patient will be able to pay any balance left unpaid by
the insurance. In seeking collection of the debt, the hospital is often thwarted by
the patient's marriage relationship. The debtor spouse may have few personal
assets, or the assets may be owned jointly with the non-debtor spouse as tenants
by the entirety.' Because the wife historically has been the spouse who did not
work outside the home and owned few personal assets independent of the hus-
band, the common-law solution to this problem was the doctrine of necessaries. 2
The common-law doctrine of necessaries imposed on the husband the duty
to provide for the necessary expenses of the wife, including her necessary medi-
cal expenses.3 Under this doctrine, creditors who provided the wife with neces-
sary goods and services could reach the personal assets of the husband in
satisfaction of the wife's debt.4 In North Carolina Baptist Hospitals, Inc. v. Har-
ris5 the North Carolina Supreme Court recently recognized that such a rule no
longer accurately reflects current attitudes. In the modem marriage, the wife is
not necessarily dependent on the husband.6 After reviewing the various ap-
proaches taken by other jurisdictions to modify the common-law doctrine of
necessaries, the Harris court extended the doctrine to hold both spouses jointly
and severally liable for the necessary medical expenses of either spouse. 7
1. See infra notes 100-06 and accompanying text.
2. The doctrine of necessaries is based on the assumption that the husband and wife are living
together. When the husband and wife are living apart, a presumption exists at common law that the
husband is not liable for necessaries furnished to the wife. Cole v. Adams, 56 N.C. App. 714, 716,
289 S.E.2d 918, 920 (1982). The wife may rebut this presumption upon a showing that the husband
expressly pledged his credit or that the husband neglected to support the wife after separation. Id.
3. See, eg., Alamance County Hosp., Inc. v. Neighbors, 315 N.C. 362, 367, 338 S.E.2d 87, 89
(1986) (husband's duty to support his family); Bowen v. Daugherty, 168 N.C. 242, 244, 84 S.E. 265,
266 (1915).
4. "Necessities or necessaries 'are those things which are essential to [a wife's] health and
comfort according to the rank and fortune of her husband.'" Cole v. Adams, 56 N.C. App. 714,
715, 289 S.E.2d 918, 919-20 (1982) (quoting 2 R. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW § 132 (4th
ed. 1979)).
5. 319 N.C. 347, 354 S.E.2d 471 (1987).
6. According to the court,
These notions [of a wife's dependency] no longer accurately represent the society in which
we live, and our laws have changed to reflect this fact. No longer must the husband be, nor
is he in all instances the sole owner of the family wealth. No longer is the wife viewed as
"little more than a chattel in the eyes of the law." Nicholson v. Hospital, 300 N.C. 295,
298, 266 S.E.2d 818, 820 (1980). No longer in all cases is the husband the supporting and
the wife the dependent spouse. No longer is the wife thought generally to be under the
domination of her husband.
Id. at 352-53, 354 S.E.2d at 474 (quoting Mims v. Mims, 305 N.C. 41, 49, 286 S.E.2d 779, 785
(1982)).
7. Harris, 319 N.C. at 353, 354 S.E.2d at 474. The Harris court did not address the question
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This Note analyzes the supreme court's holding in Harris in light of the
four approaches taken by other jurisdictions to modify the common-law doc-
trine of necessaries. The court in Harris determined that the marriage relation-
ship would be better served by extending the doctrine of necessaries to both
spouses in a joint and several fashion, rather than choosing another approach
such as abolishing the doctrine altogether. Although this approach comports
with traditional family law principles, it inadequately protects the interests of
the nondebtor spouse.
On January 20, 1982, Donnie Harris was admitted to North Carolina Bap-
tist Hospital for necessary medical treatment.8 At the time of the patient's ad-
mission, the hospital's business office requested his wife, Vern Dell Harris, to
sign a form authorizing treatment. Rather than signing the form in her own
name, Ms. Harris signed the form in her husband's name, "by Vern Dell Har-
ris.'" Ms. Harris refused to sign as guarantor. 10
The hospital provided the medical treatment, charging Mr. Harris
$3,303.61.11 When payment was not made, the hospital brought suit against
both Donnie and Ven Dell Harris for the debt.12 Summary judgment was en-
tered against Donnie Harris for the full amount of the debt.' 3 At the same
hearing, Judge Gregory dismissed plaintiff's complaint against Vern Dell Har-
ris.14 Plaintiff appealed this portion of the judgment, which was subsequently
reversed by the North Carolina Court of Appeals and remanded for further find-
ings of fact.15 Upon further findings of fact, Judge Gregory again dismissed the
complaint against Vern Dell Harris. 16 The North Carolina Court of Appeals
affirmed that decision in an unpublished opinion.17
On discretionary review, the North Carolina Supreme Court unanimously
reversed the court of appeals and held that Vern Dell Harris was liable for the
entire debt.' 8 In extending the common-law doctrine of necessaries to apply
equally to both spouses, the supreme court in Harris noted that the trend in
whether its holding would extend beyond medical services to include all necessary goods and
services.
8. It was stipulated by the parties that the treatment to Mr. Harris was necessary for his
health and well-being. Id. at 349, 354 S.E.2d at 472.
9. Id.
10. Id. "A guaranty of payment is an absolute promise by the guarantor to pay a debt at
maturity if it is not paid by the principal debtor." Investment Properties of Asheville, Inc. v. Nor-
burn, 281 N.C. 191, 195, 188 S.E.2d 342, 345 (1972).
11. Harris, 319 N.C. at 349, 354 S.E.2d at 472.
12. Id. at 348, 354 S.E.2d at 471.
13. This judgment was not appealed. Id.
14. Id.
15. North Carolina Baptist Hosps., Inc. v. Harris, 71 N.C. App. 638, 323 S.E.2d 513 (1984).
16. Harris, 319 N.C. at 348, 354 S.E.2d at 472. Prior to Harris, the doctrine of necessaries was
only applicable to medical services provided to the wife. Id. at 349, 354 S.E.2d at 472.
17. North Carolina Baptist Hosps., Inc. v. Harris, 80 N.C. App. 167, 341 S.E.2d 619 (1986),
rey'd, 319 N.C. 347, 354 S.E.2d 471 (1987).
18. Harris, 319 N.C. at 354, 354 S.E.2d at 475. Defendant argued that if the court expanded
the common-law doctrine of necessaries to include the liability of the wife for necessaries furnished
to the husband, then such a holding should be applied only prospectively because it creates a new
cause of action against the wife that did not formerly exist. New Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 15,
Harris, 319 N.C. 347, 354 S.E.2d 471 (1987) (No. 284PA86); see Borgess Medical Center v. Smith,
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other jurisdictions was towards a gender-neutral application of the doctrine. 19
The court also noted a trend toward gender neutrality in recent acts of the
North Carolina General Assembly.20
The supreme court rejected defendant's argument that the doctrine of
necessaries should be abolished. 21 The court noted that in the past the doctrine
had served the beneficial purpose of encouraging health-care providers to pro-
vide necessary medical attention to married persons.22 The Harris court also
recognized that "marriage involves shared wealth, expenses, rights, and duties,"
and each spouse has a personal duty to support the other, "a duty arising from
the marital relationship itself."'23
The Harris decision expressly overruled Presbyterian Hospital v. Mc-
Cartha,24 a case in which the North Carolina Court of Appeals held under simi-
lar facts that the doctrine of necessaries was not applicable to hold a wife liable
for the medical expenses of her husband.25 In order to understand the Harris
decision, it is first necessary to review both the history of the doctrine of neces-
saries in North Carolina and the four approaches that have been taken by other
jurisdictions to "modernize" the doctrine.
At common law the husband and wife were regarded as one legal entity.26
Upon marriage the personal property of a woman vested absolutely in the hus-
band.27 Furthermore, the husband became seised of an estate in the land of his
wife during marriage, which gave him the right to possession and control of the
estate during marriage.28 He could use the rents and profits from the wife's
estate as he pleased, and could convey his interest in the wife's property without
her consent.29 The husband could also subject the wife's personal property, as
well as his interest in her real property, to levy under execution to satisfy his
149 Mich. App. 796, 386 N.W.2d 684, 687 (1986); Jersey Shore Medical Center-Fitkin Hosp. v.
Estate of Baum, 84 N.J. 137, 152, 417 A.2d 1003, 1010-11 (1980).
19. Harris, 319 N.C. at 351, 354 S.E.2d at 473.
20. See infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
21. Defendant argued that
[for a state to have credit laws which treat a married man, or a married woman
differently from a man or woman who is not married violates the married person's consti-
tutional right of equal protection under the law. When credit is extended to any adult in
today's marketplace, the creditor is looking only to the person who expressly agrees to
make payment. Why should a married debtor be treated differently under the law from a
single creditor?
New Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 14, Harris, 319 N.C. 347, 354 S.E.2d 471 (1987) (No.
284PA86).
22. Harris, 319 N.C. at 353, 354 S.E.2d at 474.
23. Id.
24. 66 N.C. App. 177, 310 S.E.2d 409, disc. rev. denied as improvidently allowed 312 N.C. 485,
322 S.E.2d 761 (1984) (per curiam). For a discussion of McCartha, see infra notes 75-78 and accom-
panying text.
25. Id. at 179, 310 S.E.2d at 411.
26. See, eg., Combs v. Combs, 273 N.C. 462, 465, 160 S.E.2d 308, 311 (1968); Woolard v.
Smith, 244 N.C. 489, 492, 94 S.E.2d 466, 468 (1956).
27. See, eg., O'Connor v. Harris, 81 N.C. 279 (1878); Arrington v. Yarborough, 54 N.C. (1
Jones Eq.) 73 (1853); 2 R. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW § 107 (4th ed. 1979 & Supp.
1985).
28. Perry v. Stancil, 237 N.C. 442, 445, 75 S.E.2d 512, 515 (1953).
29. "Upon the birth of issue capable of inheriting the wife's land, [the husband's] estate was
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own debts.30 There arose at marriage the corresponding legal disability of a
woman to manage her own property.31
Because the married woman was considered legally incapable of owning
property and incurring debts independent of her husband, the marriage relation-
ship gave rise to the duty of the husband to support the wife. At common law,
the husband was liable for the wife's "necessaries," which included "the cost of
clothing, food, ordinary household supplies, medical attendance, expenses of
sickness,. . . as well as articles of comfort suitable to the condition and style in
which the parties were accustomed to live." 32 In exchange, the wife was legally
obligated to provide domestic services for the comfort, care, and well being of
the family, and to provide consortium to the husband.3 3 Such common-law
rules had prevailed in North Carolina through the early nineteenth century.34
However, limitations that have burdened the property rights of married women
have since been gradually liberalized and removed. By 1837 enabling statutes
had modified the common law governing the property rights of married women
in three respects. First, the wife's land could be conveyed only by a deed jointly
executed and acknowledged by both the husband and wife.35 Second, the wife
possessed independent rights in property she acquired after divorce. 36 Third,
the husband could no longer lease the lands of the wife for a term of years or for
life without the joinder of the wife.37 In 1848 the general assembly provided
that the wife's land was no longer subject to sale under execution for the debts of
the husband.38
Perhaps the greatest change in the common-law property rights of married
women in North Carolina, however, occurred at the constitutional convention of
1868 when the following provision was adopted:
The real and personal property of any female in this State acquired
before marriage, and all property, real and personal, to which she may,
after marriage, become in any manner entitled, shall be and remain the
sole and separate estate and property of such female, and shall not be
liable for any debts, obligations or engagements of her husband, and
may be devised and bequeathed, and, with the written assent of her
husband, conveyed by her as if she were unmarried. 39
Having recognized the separate estate of the wife, it was only a matter of time
until the general assembly removed the remaining disabilities of married women
to contract and to convey property in their own names. In 1911, the general
enlarged so that he immediately became the owner for the period of his natural life and he could
convey his life estate therein without the joinder of his wife." Id.
30. Id. at 445, 75 S.E.2d at 515.
31. Id.
32. Bowen v. Daugherty, 168 N.C. 242, 244, 84 S.E. 265, 266 (1915).
33. Ritchie v. White, 225 N.C. 450, 453, 35 S.E.2d 414, 416 (1945).
34. Perry, 237 N.C. at 445, 75 S.E.2d at 515.
35. 1 N.C. REv. STAT., ch. 37, § 9 (1837) (emphasis added).
36. Id. ch. 39, § 11 (1837).
37. Id. ch. 43, § 9 (1837).
38. Act of Jan. 29, 1849, ch. 41, § 2, 1848 N.C. Pub. Laws 89, 90.
39. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. X, § 6.
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assembly enacted the Martin Act, which gave a married woman the right to
contract and dispose of her property without her husband's consent.4°
The removal of the legal disabilities of married women, however, did not
affect the common-law duty of the husband to provide for the necessaries of the
wife. In Bowen v. Daugherty41 the North Carolina Supreme Court ruled on
claims against the estate of a deceased wife "consisting of funeral and burial
expenses, tombstone, doctor's bills and nursing during [the wife's] last illness." 42
The court determined that the husband, not the wife's estate, was liable for these
claims.4 3 Even though the Martin Act had removed the disabilities of married
women, that development did not affect the husband's duty to support his wife.
In describing the interaction between the Martin Act and the doctrine of neces-
saries, Justice Clark stated in concurrence:
The husband does not become liable as surety for his wife's contracts,
nor responsible for debts contracted by her, except for her support, as
above stated. And she is not made responsible for articles bought for
such support except where by contract, express or by her conduct, she
leads the seller reasonably to understand that she is assuming individ-
ual responsibility. In the latter case the husband would still remain
liable, and the seller can recover against either or both. 4
Although the doctrine of necessaries remained unchanged in North Caro-
lina until Harris, other pertinent changes occurred in the law affecting the rela-
tionship between the husband and wife. Many of the laws that historically have
treated husband and wife differently have been revised by the legislature or
courts in a gender-neutral fashion.45 For example the Equitable Distribution
Act 46 "is uniform in its treatment of parties to a marriage as equal partners in a
joint enterprise." 47 The Harris court stated that this statute appears to be "a
40. Act of Mar. 6, 1911, ch. 109, § 1, 1911 N.C. Pub. Laws 272, 272-73.
41. 168 N.C. 242, 84 S.E. 265 (1915).
42. Id. at 243, 84 S.E. at 265.
43. The Bowen court reasoned that these debts, though incurred by the.wife, were the hus-
band's responsibility:
[W]e see no reason, before or since the statute, why a debt of the husband should be
imputed to the wife. True, the general rule is that when goods are supplied or services
rendered by one person for another, the law implies a promise to pay what they are reason-
ably worth; but the principle, in our opinion, should not control when the goods were
acquired or services rendered under circumstances which created a recognized liability in
[the husband].
Id. at 244-45, 84 S.E. at 266.
44. Id. at 246, 84 S.E. at 267 (Clark, J., concurring).
45. See, eg., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-322 (1986) (providing for criminal sanctions against both
the husband and wife for nonsupport); id. § 50-13.4(b) (1987) (duty to support children no longer
exclusively the primary responsibility of the father); id. § 50-16.1(4) (1987) (abolishing the statutory
presumption that the husband is the supporting spouse for alimony purposes); see also Mims v.
Mims, 305 N.C. 41, 48, 286 S.E.2d 779, 785 (1982) (presumptive gift rule applies to both husband
and wife). But see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202 (1986) (making it illegal for any person to "peep
secretly into any room occupied by a female person"); id. § 148-6 (1987) ("no female convict shall be
worked on public roads or streets in any manner").
46. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-20 to -21 (1987).
47. Harris, 319 N.C. at 352, 354 S.E.2d at 474. See generally Sharp, The Partnership Ideal:
The Development of Equitable Distribution in North Carolina, 65 N.C.L. REv. 195, 198-201 (1987)
(discussing the "partnership" concept of marriage).
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clear break from the archaic notions reflected in earlier statutes. '48 In support
of its decision to extend the doctrine of necessaries to apply equally to both
spouses, the Harris court noted this trend towards gender neutrality. As further
support for its decision, the Harris court observed that most other states ad-
dressing the doctrine of necessaries in recent years have modified the doctrine
under one of four approaches.49
The first and most common approach has been to expand the doctrine of
necessaries by applying it equally to both. the husband and the wife. Under this
approach, the husband and wife are in effect jointly and severally liable for the
necessary medical expenses of either spouse.50 Although some state courts have
adopted this approach,51 it has often been adopted by state legislatures in the
form of family expense statutes52 or statutes specifically addressing the doctrine
of necessaries.5 3
In Richland Memorial Hospital v. Burton54 the South Carolina Supreme
Court considered a claim against the appellant husband for the medical expenses
of his deceased wife. The trial court found the husband liable under the com-
mon law doctrine of necessaries. 55 The husband appealed, alleging that the doc-
trine violated the equal protection clauses of the South Carolina and United
States Constitutions.56 The Burton court agreed with the husband, noting the
recent legislative and common-law trends in South Carolina towards gender
neutrality.57 The court concluded, however, that the doctrine of necessaries re-
mained a viable common-law doctrine.58 The court therefore extended the doc-
trine of necessaries to allow third parties providing necessaries to a husband or
wife to bring an action against the nondebtor spouse.59
Although the joint and several approach is gender neutral, it is also
procreditor. This approach gives a creditor complete discretion in the collection
48. Harris, 319 N.C. at 352, 354 S.E.2d at 474.
49. See generally Comment, The New Doctrine of Necessaries in Virginia, 19 U. RICH. L. REV.
317, 326-31 (1985) (discussing four approaches to modifying the common-law doctrine of nec-
essaries).
50. See Jersey Shore Medical Center-Fitkin Hosp. v. Estate of Baum, 84 N.J. 137, 149, 417
A.2d 1003, 1009 (1980).
51. See, eg., Cooke v. Adams, 183 So.2d 925 (Miss. 1966); Richland Memorial Hosp. v. Bur-
ton, 282 S.C. 159, 318 S.E.2d 12 (1984).
52. See, eg., COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-6-110 (1973); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 1015 (Smith-
Hurd 1980 & Supp. 1987); IOWA CODE ANN. § 597.14 (West 1981); WASH. RE. CODE ANN.
§ 26.16.205 (1986).
53. See, eg., HAw. REV. STAT. § 572-24 (1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-106 (1987); VA.
CODE ANN. § 55-37 (1986).
54. 282 S.C. 159, 318 S.E.2d 12 (1984).
55. Id. at 160, 318 S.E.2d at 13.
56. Id. See S.C. CONSr. art. I, § 3; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
57. See eg., S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-40 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Cur. Supp. 1987) (support ofhis
or her spouse and children); id § 20-3-120 (alimony and suit money); id. § 20-3-130 (alimony). See
also Boan v. Watson, 281 S.C. 516, 519, 316 S.E.2d 401, 403 (1984) (holding common-law dower
unconstitutional as violative of equal protection).
58. Burton, 282 S.C. at 160, 318 S.E.2d at 13.
59. Id. The court left open the possibility it was not adopting a pure joint and several approach
when it stated: "The issue whether, in some instances, the creditor must first seek to recover from
the estate of the spouse who received the services is not before us." Id. at 161, 318 S.E.2d at 13-14.
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of the debt by allowing the creditor to seek payment from either spouse. Be-
cause this approach does not take into account which spouse actually incurred
the debt, it has been criticized by those states adopting another approach. 60
Based on the assumption that many wives are still not financially equal to
husbands in today's society, courts employing a second approach place primary
liability on the husband for the necessary medical expenses of either spouse, and
secondary liability on the wife.6 1 In Estate of Stromsted v. St. Michael Hospital
of Franciscan Sisters,62 the Wisconsin Supreme Court extended the common-law
doctrine of necessaries to both spouses but refused to hold the wife primarily
liable.6 3 The court refused to subject the wife to joint and several liability be-
cause statistics revealed that a married woman remains behind her husband "as
an income-producing element of the family." 64 The court therefore held that
the husband must continue to be viewed as having primary liability for the
necessaries of his household and, to the extent the husband is unable to satisfy
his obligation, the creditor may seek collection from the wife. 65
A third approach places primary liability on the spouse who incurred the
debt and secondary liability on the nondebtor spouse.6 6 In Memorial Hospital v.
Hahaj67 the hospital brought an action against a married woman for medical
services she incurred in her own behalf. After recognizing the changing role of
the married woman and the marital relationship, the Indiana Court of Appeals
held the wife primarily liable and her husband secondarily liable for these medi-
60. See, eg., Memorial Hosp. v. Hahaj, 430 N.E.2d 412, 416 (Ind. App. 1982); Jersey Shore
Medical Center-Fitkin Hosp. v. Estate of Baum, 84 N.J. 137, 149, 417 A.2d 1003, 1009 (1980);
Marshfield Clinic v. Discher, 105 Wis. 2d 506, 514, 314 N.W.2d 326, 330 (1982).
61. See, eg., Marshfield Clinic v. Discher, 105 Wis. 2d 506, 314 N.W.2d 326 (1982); Estate of
Stromsted v. St. Michael Hosp. of Franciscan Sisters, 99 Wis. 2d 136, 299 N.W.2d 226 (1980). For a
discussion of the constitutionality of this approach, see Note, Inequality in Marital Liabilities: The
Need For Equal Protection When Modifying the Necessaries Doctrine, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 43, 48-
56 (1983).
62. 99 Wis. 2d 136, 299 N.W.2d 226 (1980).
63. Id. at 146, 299 N.W.2d at 231.
64. Id. at 144-145, 299 N.W.2d at 230. The court cited statistics from a 1977 study, which
stated that the average working wife contributed only about one-fourth of the family's income. Id. at
145 n.7, 299 N.W.2d at 230 n.7 (citing Labor Force Participation of Married Women, MONTHLY
LAB. REV., June 1977, at 33); see also Marshfield Clinic v. Discher, 105 Wis. 2d at 512 & n.7, 314
N.W.2d at 329 & n.7 (1982) (citing Occupational Segregation and Earnings Differences by Sex,
MONTHLY LAB. Rxv., Jan. 1981, at 49) ('Through 1978, women who worked full time earned
about 60 percent as much as men.").
65. Although the Stromsted rule is not gender neutral, its constitutionality was later upheld in a
decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court:
To satisfy a constitutional challenge, a gender based rule must serve important gov-
ernmental objectives and the means employed must be substantially related to the achieve-
ment of those objectives.
In considering the necessaries rule, as articulated in Sharpe and Stromsted, it is appar-
ent that it serves several important governmental objectives. The rule benefits families by
making it more likely that they win obtain necessary and appropriate goods and services.
It enables wives to obtain credit more easily, rather than having to depend on their hus-
bands to make necessary purchases. It also protects wives from economic hardship by
placing primary liability on husbands.
Marshfield Clinic v. Discher, 105 Wis. 2d 506, 509-10, 314 N.W.2d 326, 328 (1982).
66. See, eg., Memorial Hosp. v. Hahaj, 430 N.E.2d 412 (Ind. App. 1982); Jersey Shore Medical
Center-Fitkin Hasp. v. Estate of Baum, 84 N.J. 137, 417 A.2d 1003 (1980).
67. 430 N.E.2d 412 (Ind. App. 1982).
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cal expenses.68 The court reasoned that the modem marriage is like a financial
partnership in which either spouse is liable for his or her own medical expenses,
with the other spouse and the marital property secondarily liable.
69
Like the second approach, this approach seeks to expand the doctrine of
necessaries but limits a creditor's right to pursue his claim against both spouses
jointly and severally. Unlike the second approach, however, this approach is
gender neutral, and takes into account which spouse incurred the debt. 70 The
second approach seeks to protect the wife; the third approach seeks to protect
the nondebtor spouse.
As a final approach, some state courts have abolished the doctrine of neces-
saries altogether as violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution.7 1 In such cases only the spouse
who incurred the debt has been held liable for necessary medical expenses, ab-
sent some contractual obligation by the nondebtor spouse. 72 Rather than ex-
panding the doctrine of necessaries, these courts have concluded that this is a
policy matter better left to the legislatures of their respective states.73
The court in Harris recognized the various approaches taken by other juris-
dictions to extend the doctrine of necessaries, as well as the trend in the North
Carolina General Assembly towards gender neutrality, and concluded that the
doctrine should be extended in a gender-neutral fashion in North Carolina. 74
By its holding in Harris, the North Carolina Supreme Court expressly overruled
Presbyterian Hospital v. McCartha,75 a case in which the North Carolina Court
of Appeals refused to hold a wife liable for the necessary medical expenses of her
68. Id. at 416.
69. Id. at 415.
70. The New Jersey Supreme Court addressed the need for limitations on a creditor's right to
pursue the debt of marital partners:
Normally a person is not liable for the debt of another in the absence of an agreement.
The imposition of liability based on marital status alone is an exception to that rule. None-
theless, it is a justifiable exception. The reasonable expectations of marital partners are
that their income and assets are held for the benefit of the marital partnership and, inciden-
tally, for creditors who provide necessaries for either spouse. However, it would be unfair
to accord the same rights to a creditor who provides necessaries on the basis of an agree-
ment with one spouse as to a creditor who has an agreement with both spouses. In the
absence of such an agreement, a creditor should have recourse to the property of both
spouses only where the financial resources of the spouse who incurred the necessary ex-
pense are insufficient. Marshalling the marital resources in that manner grants some pro-
tection to a spouse who has not expressly consented to that debt.
Jersey Shore Medical Center, 84 N.J. at 151, 417 A.2d at 1010.
71. See, eg., Condore v. Prince George's County, 289 Md. 516, 425 A.2d 1011 (1981); Schilling
v. Bedford County Memorial Hosp., Inc., 225 Va. 539, 303 S.E.2d 905 (1983).
72. See generally Note, The Unnecessary Doctrine of Necessaries, 82 MIcH. L. REv. 1767 (1984)
(arguing the doctrine of necessaries has outgrown its usefulness and should be abolished).
73. See, e.g., Condore, 289 Md. at 532, 425 A.2d at 1019; Schilling, 225 Va. at, 303 S.E.2d at
908. The Supreme Court of Florida recently upheld the common-law doctrine of necessaries, and
noted that neither the court nor the state legislature had overruled it. Shands Teaching Hosp. &
Clinics, Inc. v. Smith, 497 So. 2d 644, 646 (Fla. 1986). The court refused to overrule the doctrine,
stating that the legislative branch was more suited to "receiving public input and resolving broad
policy questions." Id.
74. Harris, 319 N.C. at 353, 354 S.E.2d at 474; see supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
75. 66 N.C. App. 177, 310 S.E.2d 409, disc rev. denied as improvidently allowed per curiam,
312 N.C. 485, 322 S.E.2d 761 (1984).
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husband.7 6 Although the facts in McCartha were nearly identical to those in
Harris, the court's analysis in McCartha was completely different. The Mc-
Cartha court stated that the doctrine of necessaries was not applicable when the
hospital relied solely on the separate credit or estate of the husband.77 Because
the wife in McCartha neither contracted for nor requested the treatment given to
the husband, "[tihis situation [did] not give rise to the necessaries doctrine; and
it would not even if the gender of the parties was reversed and the hospital had
contracted only with the wife."' 78 Having held that the doctrine of necessaries
was not applicable to the case at hand, the McCartha court never even addressed
the issue whether the doctrine should be applied on a gender-neutral basis.
In contrast to McCartha, the Harris court concluded that reliance on the
separate credit or estate of the nondebtor spouse was not an essential element of
the doctrine of necessaries. 79 Vern Dell Harris was held liable for her husband's
medical expenses even though she did not request or contract for those serv-
ices.80 Not only did Harris overrule McCartha by applying the doctrine of
necessaries to a spouse who does not request or contract for necessary medical
expenses, it contradicted the dicta in McCartha to the effect that the doctrine
only applies to the husband.
The supreme court's extension of the doctrine of necessaries to both spouses
is a logical step in the evolution of the rights and duties of both husband and
wife. At common law only the husband had a duty of support. 8' However, the
wife had duties of her own, including the duty to provide the traditional domes-
tic services. 82 Even though the wife's duty to provide domestic services became
unenforceable, the husband remained liable for the support of the wife. 83 The
Harris court noted a resulting disequilibrium in the law: "[W]ives share their
husbands' freedom to contract and are additionally entitled to financial support,
while no longer being required to provide the traditional domestic services."'84
Extending the doctrine of necessaries rectified this disequilibrium by placing the
same duty of support on each spouse in a gender-neutral fashion.
The Harris court could have corrected this disequilibrium in the rights and
76. Id. at 179, 310 S.E.2d at 411.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. The court in Harris set forth the following four essential elements that must be shown to
establish a prima facie case against a spouse for necessary medical services provided to the other
spouse:
(1) medical services were provided to the spouse; (2) the medical services were necessary
for the health and well-being of the receiving spouse; (3) the person against whom the
action is brought was married to the person to whom the medical services were provided at
the time such services were provided; and (4) the payment for the necessaries has not been
made.
Harris, 319 N.C. at 353-54, 354 S.E.2d at 475.
80. The trial court found that Vern Dell Harris "neither requested her husband's admission to
the hospital, anticipated that he would be admitted, nor agreed to pay for the services." Id. at 349,
354 S.E.2d at 472.
81. See supra text accompanying note 32.
82. See supra text accompanying note 33.
83. See, eg., Ritchie v. White, 225 N.C. 450, 452-53, 35 S.E.2d 414, 415-16 (1945).
84. Harris, 319 N.C. at 350, 354 S.E.2d at 473.
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duties of the spouses just as effectively by abolishing the doctrine of necessaries.
The court noted, however, two reasons why a gender-neutral application of the
doctrine would be better accomplished by extending, rather than abolishing, the
doctrine. First, the doctrine of necessaries encourages health-care providers to
give necessary medical attention to married persons.85 Second, the court recog-
nized that marriage "involves shared wealth, expenses, rights, and duties."
86
Each spouse has a duty to support the other, "a duty arising from the marital
relationship itself and carrying with it the corollary right to support from the
other spouse." 87 The Harris court's conclusion that the marital relationship it-
self creates a sharing of wealth and a duty of support is consistent with tradi-
tional notions of marriage. At common law, the husband and wife were
regarded as one legal entity.88 Although the individual rights and independence
of the wife were later established by the removal of the married woman's disabil-
ities, 89 North Carolina law has continued to recognize the spouses as a single
entity under the tenancy by the entirety doctrine90 and the Equitable Distribu-
tion Act.91 Therefore, it is not surprising that the Harris court continued to
view the marriage as a viable entity unto itself, capable of creating its own rights
and duties. 92
In extending the doctrine of necessaries, the Harris court never discussed
which specific approach it was taking to achieve that result. The court simply
entered judgment against the wife for the entire amount of the husband's neces-
sary medical expenses. 93 Because the husband had already been held liable for
the debt,94 the court haphazardly adopted the joint and several approach with-
out offering a rationale for its choice of that particular approach.
Although the joint and several approach to extending the doctrine of neces-
saries has been widely adopted, some courts have characterized it as "equality
with a vengeance." 95 This approach takes into account neither which spouse
incurred the debt nor the financial resources of each spouse. The creditor can
proceed directly against the nondebtor spouse, regardless of that spouse's finan-
85. Id. at 353, 354 S.E.2d at 474.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
90. See infra note 100.
91. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
92. The supreme court stated that because the duty of support arises from the marriage rela-
tionship itself, attempts by a spouse to disavow this duty have no effect. Harris, 319 N.C. at 353, 354
S.E.2d at 474. However, the traditional view in North Carolina that spousal duties and rights can-
not be altered by the parties may be changing. The North Carolina General Assembly recently
adopted the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act. Act of June 25, 1987, ch. 473, § 1, 1987 N.C. Adv.
Legis. Serv. 3 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 52B-1 to -11 (1987)). The Act provides that parties
may by a written and signed premarital agreement contract with respect to "the modification or
elimination of spousal support." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52B-4(a)(4) (1987). Presumably, such an
agreement would prevent creditors who provide necessaries to one spouse from seeking collection
from the nondebtor spouse under the doctrine of necessaries.
93. Harris, 319 N.C. at 354, 354 S.E.2d at 475.
94. See supra text accompanying note 13.
95. Jersey Shore Medical Center-Fitkin Hosp. v. Estate of Baum, 84 N.J. 137, 149, 417 A.2d
1003, 1009 (1980).
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cial situation. Although the original purpose of the doctrine of necessaries was
to provide support for married women, this rationale has lost favor. 96 Because
the joint and several approach does not consider whether one spouse needs sup-
port from the other, the doctrine of necessaries has been reduced to nothing
more than a creditor's remedy.97
Furthermore, the court's imposition.of joint and several liability threatens
the protections of the married woman's property that have evolved in North
Carolina law. For example, one provision in the North Carolina Constitution
protects a married woman's property:
The real and personal property of any female in this State acquired
before marriage, and all property, real and personal, to which she may,
after marriage, become in any manner entitled, shall be and remain the
sole and separate estate and property of such female, and shall not be
liable for any debts, obligations, or engagements of her husband .... 98
An argument can be made that extending the doctrine of necessaries to hold the
wife liable creates a direct liability in the wife in her own right, and therefore
does not violate the North Carolina Constitution.99 Even if such an assertion is
true, the court's extension of the doctrine of necessaries has undermined the
intent of this provision of the constitution to give a married woman independent
control over her own property.
Another important issue is the impact Harris will have on the tenancy by
the entirety. 100 The tenancy by the entirety has traditionally protected the joint
96. Estate of Stromsted v. St. Michael Hosp. of Franciscan Sisters, 99 Wis. 2d 136, 149-50 &
n.2, 299 N.W.2d 226, 233 & n.2 (1980) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
97. Id. (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). Judge Abrahamson further stated in his dissent:
The creditor's benefit may be attained at a substantial cost to the homemaker. Under the
majority's formulation, a full-time homemaker who has supported the family by contribut-
ing her services, who has little or no income or property, and to whom the husband owes
the duty to support, becomes, in effect, a guarantor of payment for necessaries supplied to
her husband, herself and the children.
Id. at 149, 299 N.W.2d at 233 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
98. N.C. CONST. art. X, § 4.
99. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 10-11, Harris, 80 N.C. App. 167, 341 S.E.2d 619 (1986) (No.
8523DC1 142), rev'd, 319 N.C. 347, 354 S.E.2d 471 (1987).
100. The joint tenancy is a form of concurrent ownership characterized by the unities of time,
title, interest, and possession. Combs v. Combs, 273 N.C. 462, 465, 160 S.E.2d 308, 311 (1968).
Each tenant has an equal undivided interest in the whole of the property, including the right of
survivorship upon the death of the other tenant. Davis v. Bass, 188 N.C. 200, 204-05, 124 S.E. 566,
568 (1924).
The tenancy by the entirety is a form of concurrent ownership created when a fifth unity, unity
of person, is added to the other four. Combs, 273 N.C. at 465, 160 S.E.2d at 311.
This tenancy by the entirety takes its origin from the common law when husband and wife
were regarded as one person, and a conveyance to them by name was a conveyance in law
but to one person. The estate rests upon the doctrine of the unity of person, and upon the
death of one the whole belongs to the other, not solely by right of survivorship, but also by
virtue of the grant which vested the entire estate in each grantee... and the estate thus
created has never been destroyed or changed by statute in North Carolina.
Id.
In North Carolina, a tenancy by the entirety is created whenever land is conveyed or devised to
a husband and wife as such. Id. Unlike the joint tenancy, neither tenant is entitled to partition.
Jones v. W.A. Smith & Co., 149 N.C. 317, 319, 62 S.E. 1092, 1093 (1908). Each tenant has a right
of survivorship that cannot be defeated by one spouse acting alone. L & M Gas Co. v. Leggett, 273
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property in a marriage from the debts and obligations of a single spouse. °10 Be-
cause the supreme court's holding in Harris placed joint and several liability on
both spouses for the necessary expenses of either spouse, it may have opened the
door for a creditor health-care provider to use the doctrine of necessaries to
reach tenancy by the entirety property.' 0 2 Not only might the personal assets of
both spouses be subject to a judgment, the family home might be vulnerable as
well. 103
Fearing such a result, the Virginia General Assembly recently extended the
common-law doctrine of necessaries by a statute expressly stating that "[n]o lien
arising out of a judgment under this section shall attach to the judgment debtors'
principal residence held by them as tenants by the entireties. '104 Other states
have tempered the gender-neutral application of the doctrine of necessaries by
holding the debtor spouse primarily liable and the nondebtor spouse secondarily
liable. 0-5 Not only does this approach force the creditor to proceed initially
against the debtor spouse, it also protects any property held by the spouses as
tenants by the entirety.10 6
Given that Harris adopted the joint and several approach to extending the
doctrine of necessaries, a response by the North Carolina General Assembly
similar to that taken by the Virginia General Assembly appears particularly ap-
propriate.' 0 7 The Virginia statute strikes a fair balance between the competing
N.C. 547, 552, 161 S.E.2d 23, 27 (1968). The tenancy by the entirety therefore endures until one
spouse dies, an absolute divorce is decreed, or both spouses join in a voluntary conveyance. Brans-
tetter v. Branstetter, 36 N.C. App. 532, 534-35, 245 SE.2d 87, 89-90 (1978).
101. Unlike the joint tenancy, property held by the husband and wife as tenants by the entirety is
not subject to execution to satisfy a judgment entered against either the husband or the wife individ-
ually. See, eg., Sawada v. Endo, 57 Haw. 608, 615, 561 P.2d 1291, 1295 (1977); L & M Gas Co. v.
Leggett, 273 N.C. 547, 550, 161 S.E.2d 23, 26 (1968); Winchester-Simmons Co. v. Cutler, 199 N.C.
709, 712, 155 S.E. 611, 612-13 (1930); Vasilion v. Vasilion, 192 Va. 735, 740, 66 S.E.2d 599, 602
(1951).
102. Traditionally a creditor could reach entireties property on a joint obligation of the husband
and wife. See, e.g., L & M Gas Co. v. Leggett, 273 N.C. 547, 550, 161 S.E.2d 23, 26 (1968); South-
ern Distrib. Co. v. Caraway, 189 N.C. 420, 422, 127 S.E. 427, 428-29 (1925). After Harris, tradi-
tional rules on entireties property may no longer be an obstacle to creditors who provide necessary
goods and services. In light of this judicially imposed obligation on the nondebtor spouse, it is
unclear whether the North Carolina Supreme Court will extend Harris this far. See generally
Reppy, North Carolina's Tenancy By The Entirety Reform Legislation of 1982, 5 CAMPBELL L. REV.
1, 8-16 (1982) (discussing the right of a creditor of one spouse to reach the tenancy by the entirety).
103. A debtor's "aggregate interest" in real or personal property used by the debtor or a depen-
dent of the debtor as a residence is exempt from the claims of creditors up to a limit of $7,500. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 1C-1601(a)(1) (1987). To the extent a debtor has an interest in his home in excess of
$7,500, § 1C-1601 appears to authorize a forced sale with the debtor receiving the first $7,500 of
proceeds. See Peeples, New Rules For An Old Game: North Carolina's New Exemption Act, 17
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 865, 874-79 (1981).
104. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-37 (Repl. Vol. 1986). This result seems particularly appropriate be-
cause it protects only a tenancy by the entirety which is also the debtor's principal residence. There-
fore, spouses cannot defeat the rights of the creditor simply by transferring a large portion of their
property into tenancies by the entirety.
105. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
106. See, eg., Lake v. Callis, 202 Md. 581, 588, 97 A.2d 316, 319 (1953) (entireties property not
subject to judgment against husband and wife if wife was surety on, rather than maker of, note);
Southern Distrib. Co. v. Carraway, 189 N.C. 420, 422, 127 S.E. 427, 428-29 (1925) (when wife only
secondarily liable on debt, property held by entireties not subject to attachment because judgment
was not rendered on joint obligation).
107. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
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interests of the creditor and the nondebtor spouse. By protecting only the debt-
ors' principal residence, it does not turn the tenancy by the entirety into a gen-
eral device to defeat creditors by excepting all entireties property from the joint
and several effect of the doctrine of necessaries.
No one denies that the common-law doctrine of necessaries is out of step
with a modem society in which both spouses have an equal right to manage their
own individual property. However, the approach adopted in Harris undermines
that independence by giving creditors a broad remedy which, if unchecked,
might subject all of a married individual's property to seizure for the debts of a
spouse. Such a remedy might even be used to force a sale of the family home to
pay for one spouse's medical bills. In the future either the general assembly or
the supreme court should clarify the impact of Harris on the nondebtor spouse,
and in doing so, should afford some protection to that spouse's property
interests.
MARCUS L. MOXLEY
